Three issues at centre of Bangladesh politics

AS BANGLADESH celebrates its 50th year of independence, it is pertinent to ask what the defining features of politics have been for the past five decades. There is no dearth of historical accounts and narratives of political events of Bangladesh. Often the available literature periodises the political history based on regimes. Notwithstanding the importance and significance of these methods of enquiry, it can be argued that they overlook the underlying trends. The questions as to what has driven the people of the country and what has shaped the political events remain unclear.

I argue that, in the past 50 years, Bangladesh’s politics has revolved around three issues — governance, development, and identity. These three issues have remained present in politics either directly or indirectly. If one issue had assumed prominence at one time, circumstances have pushed another issue to the forefront at another juncture of history. But a closer look shows that these issues have not disappeared from the political scene. In academic discourse, governance is a complex concept and has many dimensions; but for the people of Bangladesh, it has been deeply tied to their aspirations for democracy. This is because democratic governance was the primary goal for founding the state of Bangladesh in 1971.

Foundational elements of democracy

THERE are four foundational elements of democracy. They are the sovereignty of the people, representation of the governed, accountability of the incumbent, and freedom of expression for all. The sovereignty of the people means that the people shall appoint the government and the government will be subject to the will of the people. It is contrary to the divine power, power of the dictators, or whims of any individual. The ultimate source of power rests with the people and everyone will be treated equally in the eyes of the law.

Representation is the mode of providing the consent of the governed. The structure which will govern must have representation of those who are to be governed. It is only the expressed consent of the people which gives the government the moral and legal legitimacy to govern. The incumbent has no more rights and privileges than those which the people have provided them with. There must be mechanisms to provide consent and ensure that consent has been achieved.

The essential meaning of accountability is the presence of checks and balances. Whoever rules will be obliged to be accountable — institutions, mechanisms, and procedures to ensure accountability are sine qua non. While free and fair elections are the primary mechanism of accountability, elections alone are not sufficient to check the excesses of those in power. It is also well to bear in mind that a system of accountability cannot be built without having free and fair elections.

Freedom of expression includes various dimensions of freedom — the freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the right to form associations and freedom of assembly. They are intrinsic to fundamental human rights.

Bangladesh’s democracy report card

CONSIDERING the four foundational principles of democracy, the 50-year history of Bangladesh does not speak of progress in democratic governance.

After almost two decades of civilian and military authoritarian rule, the popular movement in 1990 created the possibility of democratisation of Bangladesh. The 1991 election marked an auspicious beginning of a journey towards democracy. Bangladesh entered the phase of electoral democracy, characterised by regular competitive free elections, limited restrictions on the freedoms of expression and assembly, the presence of a vibrant civil society, and the promise of an independent judiciary.

While not all features of electoral democracy were present and the situation was far from ideal in Bangladesh, especially regarding the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, there was hope. At least, major political parties were committed to these elements. The absence and weaknesses of institutions notwithstanding, the promise of a gradual democratic transition leading to consolidation was expected. But the hope was quickly dashed in the latter part of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Democracy began to decay, thanks to the increasing trust deficit between the two major political parties, the Bangladesh Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, as well as pernicious polarisation.

The absence of an accountability mechanism and the ruling party’s penchant for unrestrained power created a semi-authoritarian system. Constitutional provisions enabled the concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister, who is also the head of the party. This transformed the system of governance into a hybrid regime.

While, in hybrid regimes, some of the elements of democracy such as regular elections are present, essential markers of authoritarianism such as the denial of fundamental civil rights also regularly occur. In Bangladesh, the difference between ‘mandate to govern’ and ‘licence to rule’ was practically obliterated as the ruling party, whoever was in power, began to use state institutions for the persecution and even annihilation of opponents.

The most important aspect was that the election became the only mechanism of gaining legitimacy, thus becoming a high-stakes event with the desire to win by any means, either through blatant rigging or stealthy manipulation. The constitutional provision of holding the election under a non-party caretaker government, incorporated in the constitution in 1996, acted as the guardrail against authoritarian tendencies. The political equilibrium, because of the de facto two-party system, was helpful in maintaining the status quo and alteration of power every five years, but the system had already begun to drift away from democracy and transmuted into a competitive authoritarian system.

The ‘soft coup’ of 2007, which brought the military back to power albeit under civilian guise, on the one hand contributed to the further weakening of the system, and, on the other hand, raised the expectation that the political leadership will learn to step back from the brink. Instead, post-2008, as the Awami League secured an overwhelming victory, it opted to do away with the competitive nature of the political system. Competitive authoritarianism began to descend into a hegemonic electoral authoritarianism, where not only the political field is uneven but also the entire electoral system is designed to deliver a victory to the incumbent.

The drift towards authoritarianism not only contravenes the spirit of the constituion but is also against the aspirations of the Bangladeshi people. The movements for democracy from 1982 to 1990, the participation of citizens in elections from 1991 to 2008, and the presence of a large number of parties in politics reflect this aspiration.

It can be recalled that, in 1991, voter turnout in elections was 55.45 per cent. In 2008, it went up to 85.26 per cent. In a survey conducted among 4,671 families under a research project in 2017, among the four issues identified by the respondents as indicators of democracy were elected representatives, an independent judiciary and the freedoms of expression and assembly. According to the 2010 Government Barometer Survey Bangladesh, conducted by BRAC University, 80 per cent of the respondents believed that elections are the significant ideal of democracy. This is followed by free public debate (71 per cent), governance by consent (60 per cent), participation in decision-making (50 per cent), and information on government activities (40 per cent). Earlier, in various surveys from 2003 to 2013, citizens repeatedly underscored these characteristics as the meaning of democracy to them. Elections where citizens can participate without any barriers have been emphasised by the respondents of various surveys over the years.

Rehman Sobhan’s comment in this regard is worth mentioning. He says, ‘50 years spent in trying to get acceptable electoral system which we have not succeeded.’ Describing the parliament as dysfunctional, he says, ‘Parliament which even when it was functioning in fact was too confrontational to its role and, of course, now it is really dysfunctional without any capacity for holding anyone accountable.’ Pointing to the executive aggrandisement, he notes, ‘You have all powerful executive now.’ Whereas, in 1990, at the last stage of the movement against dictatorial rule, there was a consensus among the political parties that, in the future, parliament would be the centre of politics. A political settlement among the elites was reached that a participatory system of power transfer would be established. The written agreement among the three alliances was, in essence, an agreement between the political parties and the citizens promising an inclusive system of governance.

Yet, it has been flouted in recent years. The election of February 1996 is a case in point. But it was two consecutive elections — in 2014 and 2018 — which have institutionalised non-inclusive elections and governance. The inclusive system of election, which delivered at least three relatively fair elections, was the cornerstone of the caretaker government provision incorporated in the constitution. But this was scrapped under the 15th amendment in 2011. The country has returned to the practice of using the Election Commission for the interests of the incumbent party, a practice which began in 1973 and was perfected by the army rulers until 1990.

The partisan use of the Election Commission not only demonstrates the unwillingness to build institutions but it also shows the lack of commitment to foundational elements of democracy. While election alone does not guarantee democracy, popular sovereignty, the representation of the governed and accountability cannot be achieved without a system of inclusive election. Yet, as Bangladesh reaches the 50th year, it can hardly claim that effective institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission hold the incumbent accountable. The absence of such institutions has enabled the concentration of power at the hands of the prime minister, initially as a slow process, but the pace has accelerated since 2009. The political culture combined with four constitutional amendments — 12th, 14th, 15th and 16th — as well as Article 70 of the constitution have paved the way to an ‘all-powerful executive’ or, in other words, a personalised system of governance.

The 15th amendment to the constitution made the election a hollow exercise as the incumbent became the overseer of the electoral process. The 2014 and 2018 elections amply demonstrated that the election has become a show of force of the activists of the ruling party in connivance with the EC and the civil administration, instead of an option to express the will of the people. In the absence of moral legitimacy, the incumbents’ reliance on coercion has reached such a height that coercion has become the defining feature of governance. The impunity enjoyed by the law enforcement agencies and the military is akin to the situation under military rulers. In 2004, the military was provided with indemnity after a three-month security operation when 40 people died in custody. But in the past decade, the frequency has superseded any previous records. Extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances have become common occurrences. Most worrying is that there is a deliberate attempt to de-politicise society through criminalising politics, creating apathy, downgrading the political nature of decision-making, and fostering clientelist linkages. These were sponsored by military rulers to cover their legitimacy deficit. Unfortunately, contemporary Bangladesh is witnessing it again.

One important way to hold the executive accountable is to have an independent judiciary. Although the constitution framed in 1972 adopted the principle of the separation of the executive and the judiciary, it remained on paper until 2007. Even after that, the process of the separation has remained incomplete. The situation can be understood from the comment of Justice Mirza Hossain Haider, who on the eve of retirement said, ‘The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but we all know and understand how it is in reality.’

As for the freedom of expression, the record of the past 50 years is uneven at its best. In recent years, however, the downward spiral has become evident. The incumbent has adopted legal measures such as the introduction of the Digital Security Act and extra-legal measures such as unleashing supporters to vilify contrarian voices. Speaking out has not only become dangerous but could also be lethal.

Promise and reality of development

BANGLADESH was founded on the hope and commitment that an egalitarian society will be established. The state will eradicate poverty and disparity. This was supposed to be the fundamental premise of development policies and strategies. In the post-independence Bangladesh, the promises echoed in development documents, but the policies that were put in place betrayed the principle. Policies of nationalisation, for example, created a rent-seeking intermediate class at the expense of poorer segments. The much-needed agricultural reform was not considered. The rhetoric of ‘socialism’ rang hollow. The reversal from this pathway, in some measures, began as early as 1974, but took a dramatic turn after 1975.

In the past five decades, the national economy has grown remarkably, particularly in terms of size. It has also undergone structural changes, transforming from an agriculture-based economy to a service-based economy. By the conventional yardstick of ‘development’ — the gross domestic product — the country has done well, particularly since 1991. As Bangladesh embarked on the path to democratisation, its economy experienced a growth spurt. The average rate of growth in the last decade was more than six per cent per year, according to official statistics. The growth of the past four decades is neither an achievement of a single regime nor of a single sector. It has been achieved through collaborative efforts of the state, the political parties which were in power, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations. At the heart of this success are three groups of people — apparel sector workers, migrant workers, and peasants. The impact of the economic growth has also led to significant positive developments in social indicators. The number of poor as well as the rate of poverty has been reduced.

The policies which contributed to the economic growth, however, also engendered a new rich class. Not only has this class grown with the patronisation of the state, but it has also created a system that can be described as crony-capitalism. A culture of plundering state resources and providing those to clients to maintain a network, described in academic literature as neo-patrimonialism, has become the defining marker of this system. A small group of people enjoys the wealth which belongs to the people. Members of this elite class have used and continue to use the banking system as their personal coffers. The huge amount of non-performing loans and the continuous growth of such loans are testimony to this pattern. These people have siphoned out money from the country to the tune of $61.6 billion between 2004 and 2016.

Anu Muhammad, who describes this new class as ‘lumpen millionaires’, contends that the class has emerged in three phases since independence. In the first phase, this class emerged through acquiring various licences and permits, engaging in smuggling, hoardings, and embezzling state-owned industries and assets. In the second phase, bank loans and the ownership of state-owned institutions were the means of their wealth accumulation. In the third phase, this class is now ‘swallowing’ banks. As Anu Muhammad points out, all wealth of the common people has now become the target of this class.

The dazzling picture of economic growth, represented in GDP figures, is a result of economic policies that have also contributed to the growing inequality. The Gini Index, a summary measure of income inequality, shows how Bangladesh is doing in this regard. In 1973, Bangladesh’s Gini index was 0.36, which increased to 0.483 in 2016. The larger the number is, the more unequal is society. Besides, according to a report of the Bangladesh Planning Commission, the share of the poor one-fifth in the national income has declined. In 1991, 20 per cent of the poor earned 6.52 per cent of the national income; in 1995–96, it declined to 5.71 per cent; in 2000, 6.15 per cent; in 2005, 5.26 per cent, and in 2010, 5.22 per cent.

In simple words, the bottom one-fifth of the population has become poorer since 1991, at a time when the gross domestic product has grown. The policies are now being touted as a panacea, and a narrative based on a false dichotomy between democracy and development is being propagated. The issue of economic and social disparity, which used to be at the front and centre of political discourse in the first two decades, has faded since. Political parties seem to have embraced economic policies that stand contrary to the promise of social justice, one of the three founding principles of Bangladesh.

Perils of identity politics

IT WAS inconceivable at the beginning of independent Bangladesh that the question of identity would become a major issue in Bangladeshi politics. The seed was, however, sown during the constitution-making process in 1972. The debate over national identity, especially railroading ‘Bengali’ as the national identity, was indicative of both the majoritarian mindset and the fault line of ethnic nationalism. The implication was far greater than the denial of smaller ethnic groups within the country, rather, it showed how the question of diversity was shunned for a constructed homogeneity.

From legal and constitutional points of view, the identity debate came to an end with the adoption of a single national identity in the constitution. But it resurfaced in 1976, when the state sponsored ‘Bangladeshi’ nationalism as the marker of the citizens of Bangladesh. Territoriality and religious identity were merged to create a new identity, posited as being inclusive to other small ethnicities of the country. Since then, Bangladeshi politics has revolved around the issue. The 15th Amendment of the constitution has attempted to reconcile the two identities, but the constitution and laws are not enough to address the issue when a contrived schism has been created and used for political gains.

In the last few decades, an impression of a conflictual relationship between the Muslim identity and the Bengali identity has been created. It is imparted that one is a denial of the other. On the one hand, there is a selective reading of history where the Bengali identity is devoid of a religious element while, on the other hand, equally selective in its perspective, the Muslim identity views ethnicity as a non-identifier and insists on a global homogenous Muslim identity. The suggestion that the struggles from the language movement to the independence war were a rejection of the Muslim identity fails to appreciate that political actors, the common people, can embrace multiple identities.

In equal measure, people who foreground the religious identity do not intend to shun their other identities, including ethnic. The conflict between the two is more contrived than is suggested by the two camps. For thousands of years, ethnic Bengalis in Bangladesh have lived with multiple and multi-dimensional identities. But the dispute has been encouraged through a skewed interpretation of history and for political gain. State apparatuses, politicians and intellectuals have fostered the conflict and placed it at the forefront of the political discourse and contributed to the schism. The identity debate has, in effect, brought the discussion on the relationship between the state and religion to the public discourse although the political situation has never been allowed to have an open debate on the issue.

Conclusion

THE hope of the citizens of Bangladesh is of a country which has inclusive governance in the form of democracy, pursues economic development which leaves no one behind, and embraces a national identity that values diversity and multiplicities. This has remained so even though the politics of the past five decades has gradually veered away from these goals. As the nation celebrates the golden jubilee, it is imperative to remember these expectations and chart a course that will make the dream a reality.

Ali Riaz is a distinguished professor of political science at Illinois State University, non-resident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council and president of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies.

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https://www.newagebd.net/article/157461/three-issues-at-centre-of-bangladesh-politics