Bangladesh at 50: The Transformation of a Nation

When Bangladesh emerged as an independent state after
experiencing a genocide in 1971, it drew little international
attention; for decades it made it into the news cycle for natural
disasters, poverty, military coups, political violence, and
corruption. In the initial years of its existence the country was
described as an international “basket case” and a test case for
development. But as it celebrates its 50th anniversary in March,
Associated Press, Suvra Kanti Das
Bangladesh can hardly be ignored, thanks to the growing
geopolitical significance of the country at a time when South Asia
has become the site of rivalry between aspirant global hegemon
China and regional power India. Bangladesh also warrants
attention because of its remarkable economic growth in the past
few decades, and successes in social indicators – often eclipsing its
neighbors.
But these positive developments are marred with ongoing
democratic backsliding characterized by repeatedly rigged
elections, dwindling freedom of speech, and a growing penchant
for authoritarianism in the government. Although the democratic
aspirations of the people of then-East Pakistan led to the war of
independence and the founding of the country with a promise of
equality, human dignity, and social justice enshrined in the
declaration of independence, the reality of the past five decades
has been far from those ideals.
Instead of democratic institutional building, prolonged military
rule and acrimony between two major parties – the Bangladesh
Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party – have
hindered sustainable growth and prevented the country from
achieving its full potential. The salience of religion in politics, due
to the expedient politics of the major political parties, a search for
moral legitimacy by those who want to cling on to power, and the
social changes experienced by the nation, cannot be disregarded.
A Growing Geopolitical Significance
Bangladesh is often called an India-locked country; a victim of
geography, it is surrounded by India on three sides. It also has a
small border with Myanmar. Due to its geographical position,
squeezed between India and Myanmar, and nominal size, it is
often considered a small country with little or no policy
importance. However, this lack of significance is surprising as the
geographical location of Bangladesh offers myriad possibilities.
With practical and independent foreign policy initiatives, its
location, especially the southward opening to the Bay of Bengal
and proximity to a rising global power – China  – could make
Bangladesh the hub of the Indo-Pacific economic corridor. The
country could be a node connecting Central and South Asia to
Southeast Asia and China.
As China’s ambitions to become a global power were manifesting,
it began investing large amounts in various projects. Bangladesh
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China in 2016
that pledged a total sum of $24 billion, which is Bangladesh’s most
extensive foreign credit line in its history. Just months before the
MoU, Bangladesh sealed a $2 billion agreement with India to
implement development projects in Bangladesh.
Although India is closer to the incumbent Bangladeshi government,
at least politically, Bangladesh continues to keep the door open for
China. The difference between Chinese and Indian policy toward
Bangladesh lies in the degree of intention to influence Bangladesh’s
domestic politics. Over the years, India has rather overtly backed
up the ruling political party, the Awami League, thus retaining its
semi-authoritarian regime. The unequivocal support of Indian
diplomats and officials to the Awami League before the highly
controversial 2014 and 2018 elections reflected India’s preference.
In general, India’s perceived interference in domestic politics and
close relationship with the Awami League over the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) has aroused strong anti-India sentiment
among a large segment of Bangladeshis. In contrast, China
successfully maintained relations with both the Awami League and
the opposition BNP, and attained bipartisan support in return. A
joint forum – the Bangladesh-China Silk Road Forum – was created
in 2019, where the major political parties, the Awami League, BNP,
and the leftists, came together to support China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).
There are other motivations for Bangladesh’s semi-authoritarian
regime to maintain strong relations with China. In recent times,
relations with the West, especially the United States, have
encountered difficulties because of the Bangladeshi government’s
poor human rights track record, the country’s shrinking
democratic space, and abject conditions in the readymade garment
sector. Recently, the United Nations called for investigations by
proper authorities into allegations of high-profile crimes revealed
in an investigative documentary by Al-Jazeera. China’s relationship
works as an alternative option for the incumbent government of
Bangladesh in case its Western allies go against the government for
human rights and other liberal democratic issues.
On the other hand, China already has a close ally in the
subcontinent: Pakistan. Building strong relations with Bangladesh
would help China build a strong foothold on both sides of India
and in the Indian Ocean. Not surprisingly, India has expressed its
concern over China’s intention of beefing up Bangladesh-China
relations. So far, the Bangladesh government has played a
balancing game to please both Asian giants. However, this is a very
delicate game to play. A failure to maintain balanced ties with the
two rivals may result in an adversarial relationship with one or the
other, similar to the classic international relations concept of
strategic triangles. Thus, Bangladesh’s foreign policy success in the
decades ahead will depend on how adroitly and for how long
Bangladesh can continue walking the tightrope.
In this geopolitical equation, the United States seems largely
absent, although Washington and Dhaka have remained close
through economic and security cooperation, particularly since
2001. The United States is Bangladesh’s largest export market, and
U.S. investment has increased remarkably in recent years.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the two countries has
fluctuated since independence. In the early years Bangladesh’s
foreign policy was tilted toward the Indo-Soviet alliance, thus
keeping the U.S. at arm’s length. The situation changed after the
1975 coup; under then-General Ziaur Rahman’s government
Bangladesh’s foreign policy orientation shifted toward the West.
This orientation continued under military regimes and civilian
elected governments since 1991. In some ways, the current U.S.
policy toward Bangladesh was shaped by the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority nation,
attracted U.S. counterterrorism interest. Then-Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s visit in 2012 gained media attention when she
focused on Bangladesh’s possible significance in an Indo-Pacific
economic corridor. The U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh from 2011
to 2015, Dan Mozena, also reiterated the possibility of Bangladesh
becoming a significant hub that could link Indo-Pacific countries.
In January 2021, just before leaving office, the Trump
administration declassified its “United States Strategic Framework
for the Indo-Pacific.” The main goal of the strategy is to ensure
continued dominance over China. To ensure that, U.S. strategy
relies on accelerating India’s rise as an offset to China. The
declassified report clearly states that the U.S. strategy in the IndoPacific is mainly based on India, that India should take a leading
role in South Asia and maintain Indian Ocean security. To ensure
Indian preeminence, the U.S. strategy aims to accelerate India’s rise
as a military power and make it a major defense partner. This
approach, built on making India a countervailing force to China in
the region, has serious drawbacks as it provides India a blank
check in the region. India’s actions may not be consistent with the
U.S. position on issues related to Bangladesh. That divergence
emerged in 2013 in advance of the January 2014 general election in
Bangladesh. While the United States insisted on an inclusive
election, India offered unqualified support to the Awami League,
which proceeded with an election boycotted by almost all
opposition parties.
As Trump’s policies to counter China in the Indo-Pacific region
largely received bipartisan support, it is unlikely that the Biden
administration will bring about a dramatic change, although
India’s democratic credentials are now in free fall under the Modi
government. Whether the U.S. ignores the regional dynamics and
different contexts in emerging partner countries will influence the
trajectory of the relationship. As anti-Indian sentiment in
Bangladesh is on the rise due to a number of unresolved issues,
including water sharing, the killing of Bangladeshi citizens by
Indian border guards, and the anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric of the BJP
leadership, franchising Bangladesh policy to Delhi is likely to be
counterproductive. The Biden administration should formulate its
policy targeting local contexts, keeping in mind domestic politics,
and the prevailing sociopolitical culture, rather than accelerating
Indian dominance over so-called small partners. Besides
strengthening military capacity, consolidating democracy and
human rights can help develop a successful U.S. alliance in the
region.
Moving Away From the Founding Ideals 
In 1971, when Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign nation with
democratic aspirations, its new constitution promised an inclusive
liberal democratic system of governance. However, Bangladesh’s
past five decades have not been a linear journey toward
democracy. The hope for a liberal democratic nation began to fade
soon after independence when the newly founded country's
leadership deviated from the fundamental tenets of democracy
and formed a one-party populist authoritarian government in
January 1975. The regime was replaced through a series of violent
military coups between August and November, when the country's
founding leaders, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, their family
members, and associates, were brutally killed – at their homes and
inside jail after being incarcerated. The nation moved from civilian
authoritarianism to military authoritarianism. In the following 15
years, the country experienced military rule and several failed
coups, witnessed the assassination of another president – Ziaur
Rahman – in 1981 and the rise of yet another military leader – H.
M. Ershad – in early 1982. The entire period deprived Bangladeshi
citizens of democracy and the promised inclusive political system
of governance.
An eight-year pro-democracy movement that brought all political
parties closer and was spearheaded by opposition parties
culminated in a popular uprising in December 1990 that deposed
the military government. The uprising raised hopes for
democratization at last in Bangladesh. That expectation was based
on the lessons of pro-democracy movements elsewhere, and
particularly an agreement signed by the political parties at the
height of the movement promising to adhere to the fundamental
canons of liberal democracy such as fair elections, freedom of
assembly, and freedom of the press, among others.
A fair election and peaceful transfer of power to an elected
government in 1991 marked the beginning of Bangladesh’s
democratization process. The BNP won the 1991 election. However,
the opposition – the Awami League – was unwilling to play by the
same rules. In subsequent elections, the Awami League and the
BNP swapped place governing and being in opposition every five
years. The trust deficit among the major political parties, especially
the Awami League and the BNP, engendered acrimony, street
agitation, and violence. The incessant wrangling between the two
parties rendered the parliament dysfunctional. Instead of
consolidating democracy and building democratic institutions, an
all-powerful “Prime Ministerial System” was created, in which the
prime minister remained beyond scrutiny and accountability.
Thus, the concentration of power in one office created the
opportunity for the emergence of a constitutionally permitted
authoritarian leader.
Although the institutions needed for the consolidation of
democracy remained either weak or absent, elections were held
somewhat fairly between 1991 and 2008, thanks to the caretaker
government system. Except for the February 15, 1996 election,
which was marred by rampant vote-rigging, all four national
elections in that period ensured a peaceful transfer of power.
When the incumbent BNP tried to manipulate the caretaker system
in 2006, violent street protests broke out. Heightened violence and
international pressure paved the way for the military to step in
and install a caretaker technocratic government. Although the
intervention initially had public support and the blessing of the
international community, domestic discontent, the Asian economic
crisis, an inability to deliver on the promised political reforms, an
ill-conceived notion of removing two main political leaders
(Khaleda Zia of the BNP and Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League)
from politics, and pressure from international actors forced the
military to hold an election in late 2008 which produced a sizable
victory for the Awami League.
With a three-fourths majority in the parliament, the Awami League
began to adopt measures in 2010 that were designed to weaken the
opposition incrementally, make elections ineffective, muzzle the
press, and create a culture of fear. To establish complete control
over politics, the Awami League government removed the
caretaker government provision from the constitution, which had
ensured the previous four fair elections. The government also
adopted legal and extrajudicial measures to silence critics. Two
legislative acts – an amendment to the 2006 Information and
Technology Act in 2013, notably increasing penalties in Section 57,
and the Digital Security Act of 2018 – played a vital role in
employing harsh punitive measures for criticizing the government,
allowed arrest without a warrant and indefinite detention, and in a
practical sense criminalized dissent. Furthermore, between 2009
and 2018, at least 1,921 people became victims of extrajudicial
killings, and 109 were victims of enforced disappearances,
according to Odhikar, a human rights group.
The incumbent Awami League government also took steps to
control the judiciary. Against the spirit of the separation of powers,
the government issued rules that retained the power of
appointment, administration, and removal of lower court judges in
the president's hands instead of the Supreme Court. In another
instance, when a chief justice ruled against an amendment that
empowered the parliament to impeach Supreme Court judges in
2018, he was forced to leave the country, according to his published
memoir. With legal and extralegal repressive measures and control
over the judiciary, it became easier for the Awami League
government to persecute opposition leaders with frivolous cases
and silence criticism.
Thus, it was not surprising when the incumbent government won
both the 2014 and 2018 elections by astonishingly large margins,
with the BNP and other opposition parties boycotting the 2014
contest entirety. With the help of the administration, the election
commission, and law enforcement agencies, the Awami League
and its allies secured 288 seats out of 300 in the 2018 election. The
2018 election was described by the New York Times as “farcical”
and by the Economist as “transparently fraudulent.” The elections
were manipulated to create parliaments with no opposition and
the legislative body became subservient to the executive. Beyond
shrinking space for dissent and adopting increasing draconian
measures, the incumbent government also created a situation in
which the boundaries between the state, the government, and the
ruling party have become blurred.
With two consecutive rigged elections held in 2014 and 2018, the
adoption of legal measures to curb freedom of expression,
increasing incidents of extrajudicial killings, and allegations of
infringing on judicial independence, the past few years clearly
show how far Bangladesh has moved away from the promises of
1971 and the commitment to the people made at the beginning of
the democratic era in 1991. The limited space provided to the
opposition, regularly held elections, and democratic rhetoric are
the façade of a hybrid regime.
The Return of Religion to Politics
Secularism was included as a state principle in the Bangladeshi
Constitution framed in 1972, against the backdrop of the use of
Islam as justification for Pakistani rule for 22 years. In theory, this
consigned religion to the private realm, and therefore did away
with the mix of religion and politics. But 50 years later, religion has
returned to the center stage of politics in Bangladesh. The rhetoric
of political leaders is infused with religious references, the
incumbent has succumbed to pressure from conservative Islamists
in recent years, and religion-based political parties tend to exercise
significant influence in politics.
Unfortunately, the pathway for religion returning to politics began
soon after the constitution was written. The meaning of
“secularism” remained vague to both the ruling elites and the
common masses; the government quickly began undercutting the
spirit of secularism through an array of activities, including
broadcasting religious programs on state-controlled media.
However, in recent decades, incessant and bitter animosity
between the two major political parties, the Awami League and the
BNP, prepared fertile ground for the rise of Islamists as political
actors. Both top-down and bottom-up processes influence the
increasingly dominant role of religion in state and society. Over the
years, the government and political parties took initiatives to
Islamize political discourse and legitimize Islamist actors.
Meanwhile, Islamist organizations and movements played a vital
role in Islamizing society.
Before Bangladesh witnessed its democratic transformation in the
1990s, almost two decades of military regimes showed a
predilection toward Islam as a political ideology and a marker of
national identity. Military rulers gave constitutional legitimacy
through the removal of secularism from the constitution in 1978
and the declaration of Islam as the state religion in 1988. The major
political parties provided political legitimacy to Islamists when
they allied with the pro-democracy movement.
During the democratic period starting in 1991, the ruling parties
and opposition made pacts and alliances with Islamist parties to
attain their political goals. Before the 1996 election, the Awami
League came to an unwritten understanding with the Jamaat-eIslam (JeI), the largest Islamist party in the country, which had
actually opposed independence. In 1999, the BNP formed an
alliance with the JeI and won the 2001 election. Before the election
scheduled in January 2007, again, these parties brought Islamists
into their platforms to achieve the immediate goal of securing
victory. The Awami League signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Bangladesh Khilafat Majlish (BKM), a
radical Islamist party. The BNP-led four-party alliance also
included Islamist parties – Islamic Oikkyo Jot (IOJ) and the JeI –
who insisted that the only way to save Islam was to vote for the
alliance. This tendency of cajoling Islamists was also on display
ahead of the 2018 national election, which the Awami League won
in a landslide. Among the total 66 Islamist political parties in
Bangladesh, the Awami League-led alliance included an astounding
61; the BNP-led alliance had five within its fold.
Interestingly, the Islamists received more political legitimacy and a
greater social foothold after a massive protest in 2013 against the
Islamists. A youth-led monthlong sit-in, referred to as the Shahbag
movement, demanded capital punishment for those convicted of
crimes against humanity in the 1971 war. A special tribunal
established by the Awami League in 2010 to try those who
committed war crimes began delivering verdicts in February 2013.
Many of those who were charged were high-ranking leaders of the
JeI. The JeI and the BNP alleged that the trials were politically
motivated, while the Awami League insisted that the process was
intended to bring an end to impunity.
The Awami League government moved quickly to co-opt the 2013
Shahbag protest and guided it to its benefit. In a countermovement,
Islamists condemned the Shahbag protest and its organizers as
anti-Islamic and branded them as atheists. Smaller Islamist
organizations and Qawmi madrassa-based groups gathered under
the banner of the Hefazate Islam (HI), or Safeguard of Islam. The
HI organized a long march to the capital in April 2013 and issued a
13-point list of demands, including the introduction of an antiblasphemy law carrying the death penalty for anyone who
“insults” Islam and the Prophet.
Although the Awami League government initially took a hard
stance against the HI, it later shifted its position. The incumbent
regime’s authoritarian turn, especially since the non-inclusive
election of 2014, prompted the party to rely on Islamic rhetoric and
befriending conservative Islamists for legitimacy. By early 2014,
the government sent clear signals that it would rather move away
from the secularists to prove its credential as the guardian of
Islam. The government began to appease the Islamists by revising
school textbooks in 2017 and removing the works of non-Muslim
authors, as suggested by the HI. In addition, Lady Justice’s statue
was removed from the Supreme Court premises, as it was deemed
un-Islamic by the Islamists. In continuing attempts to appease the
Islamists, in 2018, the government decided to construct 560
mosques around the country.
Concurrent with the rise of conservative and radical Islamists
within mainstream politics was the proliferation of violent
extremist Islamist groups within the country and the presence of
transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida in the Indian
subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State. Despite recent success in
taming these terrorist groups through kinetic measures, the
likelihood of their resurgence is strong because of the changes in
social ethos, the absence of democracy, and religion’s heightened
role in politics.
Socioeconomic Transformation
The Bangladeshi economy has witnessed significant growth in
recent decades as its economic structure also underwent changes.
Before independence in 1971, the economy was mainly dependent
on agriculture. Now, services and industry are the primary engines
of Bangladesh's economy, thanks to remittances sent by migrant
workers and the growth of the readymade garment sector.
Bangladesh has emerged as the second-largest apparel exporter in
the world. The garment sector is also the biggest provider of
employment; 4 million work in factories, 3.2 million of whom are
women. The garment sector’s revenue increased from a meager
$40,000 in 1979 to a staggering $34.13 billion in 2019. However, this
success has not come without costs: the suffering of workers, low
wages, and a lack of compliance with basic safety standards in
many garment factories. After a number of deadly accidents,
including the collapse of a factory building called Rana Plaza in
2013, which took more than 1,200 lives and injured at least 2,500,
two major safety initiatives by the world’s leading brands and
retailers were tasked to inspect and oversee work at in the
country’s factories. Besides the garment sector, remittances from
migrant workers, mostly in the Middle East, are a major source of
revenue, which has been increased from $23.71 million in 1976 to
$16.37 billion in 2019. Bangladesh is now the ninth largest
recipient of remittances in the world.
According to official statistics, since the democratic transition in
1991, Bangladesh’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has continued to
rise between 5 and 6 percent per year. Growth was 7.8 percent in
the 2017-18 fiscal year and 7.3 percent in 2019-20. Bangladesh is
the fifth fastest-growing economy in the world. However, some
research organizations are skeptical about the official statistics,
pointing to incoherence between various indicators and GDP
growth claims. In the last few decades, Bangladesh also witnessed
a striking decline in poverty, improvements in the infant and child
mortality rate, sanitation, and women’s education.
Bangladesh's social and economic successes have led many
economists and practitioners to call it a “Bangladesh Paradox” –
that is, achieving these successes notwithstanding poor
governance, high population density, a limited natural resource
base, underdeveloped infrastructure, frequent natural disasters,
and political instability. Bangladesh’s economic success is
commendable, but the progress has also caused rising inequality
and disparity. A New York-based research firm, Wealth-X,
published a report in 2019 on the 10 fastest-growing high net worth
countries. Bangladesh stood third on the list. Bangladesh is now a
home of new millionaires, while income equality is rising at an
alarming rate. One in six persons in Bangladesh are
undernourished, according to a U.N. report. While in the past
decade, the “Bangladesh paradox” was meant to point to
Bangladesh’s economic and social successes despite poor
governance, it is increasingly indicating that a large segment of the
population is being left behind despite financial gains for a few.
Like other countries, Bangladesh has experienced changes in its
social fabric, values, and culture due to unprecedented
globalization and technological innovations. With the rise of
consumerism and individualism, previously prevalent and strong
social bonds are declining, and society’s lack of compassion is
rising. Digital media, particularly the internet, played an important
role in bringing global popular culture, cuisine, and lifestyles to
Bangladesh. With the availability of cheap mobile phones and
internet connections, a large segment of the population has access
to information. As of December 2020, the total number of internet
subscribers in Bangladesh was 111.9 million. The total number of
mobile phone connections was 163 million, and social media users
totaled 36 million in January 2020. However, inequality is still
prevalent; in 2019, only 13 percent of the population had access to
the internet. Moreover, the integration of global and local culture
and values has not always been harmonious. There is also evidence
that Islamists have been effectively using new media to reach
audiences and propagate their ideology.
The Last Words
The past five decades of Bangladesh’s independence have been a
journey of transformation. Despite a lack of natural resources,
poor infrastructure, an adverse environment, and high population
density, the people of Bangladesh have demonstrated resilience
and achieved many successes. A country that was unknown to the
world has earned international recognition as the largest
contributor to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. A
development model based on microcredit invented by the
Grameen Bank has changed the lives of millions at home and
abroad, and Bangladesh has been the home of world’s largest
nongovernmental development organization, called BRAC.
This extraordinary progress has been tainted by a lack of
democracy, severe violations of human rights and progressive
attenuation of tolerance. Instead of going forward by consolidating
democracy and strengthening state institutions, in recent years the
country has  moved backward, undermining the basic tenets of
democracy. As the country reaches its golden jubilee, it stands at a
crossroads: Will its achievements become sustainable and
inclusive, or will it go down the path of becoming an authoritarian
state? Its geopolitical importance provides it opportunities, but the
future of Bangladesh lies in how it uses these opportunities to
thrive to its potential.
The Authors
Dr. Ali Riaz is a distinguished professor of political science at Illinois State University,
and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Riaz’s recent publications include
“Election in A Hybrid Regime: Explaining the 2018 Bangladeshi Election” (2019). He has
coedited “Political Violence in South Asia” (2019), and “Routledge Handbook of
Contemporary Bangladesh” (2016).
Dr. Saimum Parvez is a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science and
Sociology in North South University, Bangladesh. His recent publications include articles
titled "Anatomy of a rigged election in a hybrid regime: the lessons from Bangladesh" in
Democratization and “Bangladeshi Violent Extremists: What do We Know” in Terrorism
and Political Violence (both co-authored with Ali Riaz).