Political transition in Bangladesh may move the country away from a dark chapter, but risks of mass violence against civilians remain

In November 2017, the Simon-Skjodt Center released a report that detailed concerns about the risk of mass atrocities in Bangladesh, with a particular focus on the country’s December 2018 elections. The report found that the risk of mass atrocities centered around political competition between the ruling Awami League party, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) opposition alliance. Some violent incidents occurred around the elections, but mass killings of civilians did not. The Awami League’s electoral victory and consolidation of political power, and the shrinking space for political opposition and civil society, however, threatened the future of democracy in the country. 

In the summer of 2024, when student protesters took to the streets to oppose government policies and express growing dissatisfaction, the Bangladeshi government responded violently. The government’s response led to growing public pressure for change. On August 5, 2024, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled the country. Days later, an interim government was formed, headed by Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus. 

Dr. Ali Riaz, an expert on Bangladeshi politics at Illinois State University, shares his analysis of mass atrocity risks facing civilians in Bangladesh after the transition.

The Simon-Skjodt Center previously found that mass atrocity risks in Bangladesh were rooted in political competition between the Awami League and the BNP. In your opinion, what are the most significant risks today?

The situation has further deteriorated since your last analysis, as the politics in Bangladesh has become more polarized in the previous years under the Sheikh Hasina regime. Hasina’s Awami League party deepened political and social divisions to help it dominate politics. As the Hasina regime became more dependent on brute force, it used the state apparatuses and its party activists to confront any dissent. Law enforcement agencies and Bangladesh Awami League (AL) activists killed approximately 500 people and injured thousands more between mid-July and August 5, 2024.  Revamping the law enforcement agencies and holding members of the security forces accountable for crimes will help regain respect and minimize the distance between law enforcement and the citizens. But the structural impact of the violent episode will be long-lasting. Two camps will emerge—those who participated and supported the uprising, and those who will remain loyal to the past regime. Such a schism can fuel risks of group-targeted violence.

Do you see any scenarios in which civilians could face large-scale, targeted attacks in the near future? Which scenarios do you think may be most likely or most concerning? 

Ahead of the downfall of the regime in August 2024, Bangladesh had experienced the most brutal crackdown and widespread violence since the country’s independence in 1971. The ferocity and rapidity of the spread of violence was unimaginable even though Bangladesh has experienced past bouts of political violence. The way the state apparatuses were used against unarmed civilian protesters between July 16 and August 5, it seemed like a war between the state and its people. After the downfall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the violence took a different shape as police, AL supporters and some members of minority communities faced the fury of angry people. The absence of police on the street and mayhem provided opportunities to settle personal scores as well. But there also seem to have been coordinated attempts by the AL activists to unleash violence to create panic and destabilize the situation.

These could be precursors of large-scale violence against civilians in the coming weeks and months. Desperate AL supporters, encouraged by their leaders within and outside the country, may try to demonstrate that the party is not a spent force. The most worrying scenario is that sporadic incidents of violence continue over months and devolve into conflicts between state security forces and AL activists. I am also afraid that members of the Hindu community may be attacked, which – in addition to the direct harm to victims – can be spun by political opportunists as examples of the rise of anti-Hindu Islamist forces and the failure of the interim government to provide safety. 

Approximately one million Rohingya refugees from Burma have sought safety in Bangladesh. Would you expect any changes regarding insecurity or risks facing Rohingya refugees as a result of the political turmoil in Dhaka?

The political upheaval, prevailing uncertainties, and change in the government are unlikely to have any near-term impact on the Rohingya refugees. Two factors will shield the Rohingya refugees from being embroiled in the political situation. First, the interim government’s approach towards the Rohingya refugees will be similar to that of the previous government. Professor Yunus has promised to continue support to Rohingya refugees. Second, international organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization of Migration (IOM), can continue providing services and will not become involved in domestic politics. In recent months, violence in the camps has increased due to turf wars between various groups (namely the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization) and the volatile situation across the border. These developments are not connected to the political situation in Bangladesh. However, one unfortunate impact is that political changes will shift the focus away from the plight of the Rohingya, who require long-term support after the coup in Burma in 2021 and as the ongoing conflict in Arakan State makes repatriation elusive.

What should policymakers and scholars watch for in the coming weeks and months?

For the past 15 years, law enforcement agencies have committed gross violations of human rights and enjoyed impunity. Those who were in commanding positions must be held accountable. Policymakers should closely watch whether the interim government succeeds in preventing any kind of reprisal while bringing perpetrators to justice. Structural changes in institutions are necessary to end the culture of impunity and establish rule of law. Policymakers and scholars should monitor whether such moves are taken, and where necessary, the international community needs to offer help.

An important aspect that Bangladesh watchers should follow is how the supporters of the deposed Hasina regime—both in Bangladesh and in India— behave in the coming months. If they succeed in creating instability through violent activities, it may engender a cycle of reprisal, and the country may plunge into a low-intensity conflict, which in turn can pose serious risks to civilians.

Dr. Ali Riaz is a political scientist with research interests in South Asian politics, democratization, violent extremism, and Bangladeshi politics. He is a Distinguished Professor of political science at Illinois State University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow of Atlantic Council, and the President of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies. He served as a Visiting Researcher at the Varieties of Democracy Institute in Sweden (2023) and as a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at Washington D.C. (2013). His recent publications include Pathways for Autocratization: The Tumultuous Journey of Bangladeshi Politics (Routledge, 2024), The Charade: Bangladesh’s 2024 Election (Prothoma, 2024) and a co-authored book How Autocrats Rise: Sequences of Democratic Backsliding (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum.

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UHMM | August 22,2024